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Innateness is one of the central concepts of cognitive
science; but it is also a source of considerable con-
fusion. In this article, I survey recent attempts to under-
stand the notion of innateness as it figures in cognitive
science and indicate which is likely to prove most fruit-
ful. One approach draws directly on our ‘commonsense’
views about innate traits. Another aims to characterize
innateness in terms of concepts drawn from biology,
such as genetic determination. Yet neither strategy has
met with much success. This could indicate that a satis-
factory account of innateness needs to make use of the
conceptual resources of cognitive science itself. A
proposal that takes this suggestion seriously is out-
lined, and an appeal is made for a more systematic
assessment of the role and significance of the notion of
innateness to cognitive science.
Innateness hypotheses have played a pivotal role in the
development of cognitive science and have been invoked to
explain a broad array of psychological phenomena,
including theory of mind [1], arithmetic [2,3], folk physics
[4] and language [5,6]. In spite of their prominence,
however, it remains obscure how such hypotheses – and
the notion of innateness on which they depend – ought to
be understood.
Troubles with the notion of innateness are hardly novel.
As far back as the 18th century, the empiricist philosopher
David Hume complained that it was both ill-defined and
permitted those incautious enough to use it to ‘draw out
their disputes to a tedious length, without ever touching
the point in question.’ [7]. Yet the need for a satisfactory
account of innateness has become even more pressing in
recent years. One reason is that the emergence of novel
experimental techniques, especially in developmental
neuroscience, has made it harder to determine what
should count as evidence for or against innateness [8–11].
Perhaps even more importantly, however, the very idea of
innateness has increasingly come under attack from those
– such as developmental systems theorists – who view it
as scientifically unnecessary or even incoherent [12,13];
and this attitude is very much reflected in large regions of
contemporary biology where talk of innateness has fallen
into disrepute [14].
Such considerations provide cognitive scientists who
aim to characterize our innate cognitive endowment with a
strong motive to clarify the notion of innateness on which
such inquiries depend. In this article I survey and assess
current efforts to understand innateness. Although no
entirely satisfactory account exists as yet, I maintain that,
contrary to what many appear to suppose, the notion of
innateness used in cognitive science may turn out to be
neither identical to familiar commonsense conceptions of
innateness nor borrowed from other scientific disciplines,
such as genetics or developmental biology. Instead, the
notion used by cognitive scientists may reflect the specific
explanatory concerns and theoretical commitments of
cognitive science itself.
Innateness and commonsense
In contrast to earlier attempts to understand innateness
[15], recent efforts have been largely unconcerned with
‘ordinary language conceptual analysis’ – that is, roughly
speaking, with characterizing the meaning of our ‘com-
monsense’ concept of innateness. The rejection of this
project is twofold. First, the newer accounts tend to focus
on the notion of innateness as it figures in science – in
particular, cognitive science – as opposed to ordinary
discourse. Second, they are far less concerned with
defining the meaning of the term ‘innate’ than with
explaining its role and significance within the sciences.
The default assumption is that scientific practices track
some theoretically important property and that the goal of
an account of innateness is to identify what that property
might be. Even so, many familiar proposals draw on the
commonsense connotations of the term ‘innate’; and it is
important to see why such claims are unsatisfactory as
accounts of the notion used in cognitive science.
Innateness as non-acquisition
A familiar claim about innate traits is that they are not
acquired. On this view, for example, the thesis that
universal grammar is innate amounts to the claim that
it is a non-acquired cognitive structure. As stated,
however, this account is unsatisfactory, although not
because it is false, but because it is vacuous. The problem
is that there are lots of different notions of acquisition and
it is far from clear which is relevant to understanding
innateness. To characterize innateness in terms of non-
acquisition thus merely trades one problem for an equally
difficult one – namely, explicating the relevant sense in
which innate traits are not acquired.
By way of illustration, consider the following ‘minimal
notion’ of acquisition: a characteristic is acquired by an
object (e.g. an organism) if and only if there is some period
of time when the object has the characteristic in question
but some prior period when it does not. This is a perfectly
sensible notion of acquisition and yet clearly insufficient
for drawing the innate/non-innate distinction because, in
this minimal sense, all cognitive structures are acquired.
Human cognitive structures are traits of biologicalCorresponding author: Richard Samuels (richard.samuels@kcl.ac.uk).
Review TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.8 No.3 March 2004
www.sciencedirect.com 1364-6613/$ - see front matter q 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.01.010
organisms and it is entirely plausible to maintain that
there is a point sufficiently early in development when
humans lack any cognitive structures whatsoever. (A
blastula is, for example, a ball of cells altogether lacking in
cognitive characteristics.) In which case, if innate traits
are just the ones that are not acquired (in the minimal
sense), then there are obviously no innate cognitive traits
whatsoever.
Of course, the conclusion to draw is not that innateness
claims are trivially false or that they cannot be character-
ized in terms of some notion of (non-) acquisition. Rather,
all that follows is that something more substantial than
the minimal notion is required. But what more is needed?
What additional constraints are required to develop a
satisfactory account of innateness? This is, in effect, the
issue that all accounts of innateness need to address.
Innateness as presence at birth
One familiar suggestion is that innate traits must satisfy
certain temporal constraints: in particular that they must
be present at birth or ‘inborn’. (This is tantamount to
claiming that innate traits are the ones that are acquired,
in the minimal sense, by the time of birth.) Yet despite its
long philosophical heritage and inclusion in dictionary
definitions, this view is unsatisfactory. For although
presence at birth may be evidence of innateness, it is
strictly speaking neither necessary nor sufficient. It is not
sufficient because prenatal learning is possible [16,17]. In
which case, the paradigmatic example of traits that are not
innate – namely, learned traits – can be present at birth.
Nor is presence at birth necessary for innateness
because, as Descartes observed almost four centuries
ago, innate characteristics can be acquired (in the minimal
sense) quite late in development. This point is commonly
made by analogy with non-psychological traits – such as
pubic hair and other secondary sexual characteristics –
that are plausibly innate but clearly not present at birth.
According to nativists in cognitive science, what goes for
morphological traits is true of psychological ones as well.
Alan Leslie and his collaborators have maintained, for
example, that the innateness of a theory of mind
mechanism is wholly consistent with the thesis that it
develops postnally [18]. Similarly, concept nativists very
frequently endorse the view that innately specified
concepts can be the product of postnatal maturation [5,19].
Innateness as the product of internal causes
Another common claim is that innate characteristics are
the products of internal causes as opposed to external or
environmental ones [20]. In their influential book Rethink-
ing Innateness, for example, Jeffrey Elman and his co-
authors maintain that a trait is innate if and only if it is
‘the product of interactions internal to the organism’ [9].
Literally construed, however, this proposal is unsatis-
factory. Like virtually all contemporary theorists, nativists
wholeheartedly accept the Interactionist Thesis that
cognitive characteristics are caused jointly by both
internal and environmental factors [21,22]. Indeed, this
is little more than a banal truism that holds for all human
traits. A foetus does not develop arms and legs, for
example, without exchanging oxygen, water and nutrients
with its mother; and a neonate does not develop teeth and
hair without breathing, drinking and eating: all of which
involve interaction with an environment external to the
organism.
In addition to these merely nutritive contributions,
however, nativists very frequently insist that the environ-
ment – and indeed environmentally derived information –
has a more specific role to play in the development of
innate cognitive structure. In particular, a common claim
by nativists is that environmental factors act as inputs to
‘triggering’ processes – roughly speaking, ‘brute-causal’,
non-psychological processes that eventuate in innate
cognitive structures [23]. It is, to be sure, notoriously
unclear what triggering is supposed to be [24]; and no
doubt this is a failing on the part of nativists. But it is one
thing to accuse nativists of insufficient clarity and quite
another to insist that they hold the deeply implausible
view that environmental factors play no role in the
development of innate traits. The former accusation is
warranted; the latter merely turns nativism into a
strawman: a position that is easily refuted but accepted
by no one.
Innateness and biology
If commonsense seems unlikely to furnish cognitive
science with a satisfactory notion of innateness, then
perhaps we should look to contemporary biology. To
anyone with even a passing awareness of recent
‘nature–nurture’ debates, this might appear an attractive
strategy. In particular, it might seem that contemporary
biology has constructed – or, at any rate, is close to
constructing – a notion of genetic determination that
permits a thoroughly modern and scientific account of
innateness [19].
Alas, matters are not so straightforward. Although
biology in general and genetics in particular are central to
the study of human cognition, it is not at all clear that they
yield an unproblematic notion of genetic determination
that maps smoothly onto the concept of innateness used by
cognitive scientists. Instead, what one finds in biology is an
altogether messier situation: one in which the notion of
genetic determination remains both vague and highly
contentious whereas other, more precisely defined geno-
type–phenotype relations fail to map smoothly onto the
notion of innateness.
Innateness as genetic determination
According to genetic accounts of innateness, a phenotypic
trait is innate (for a particular organism) only if it is
determined by genetic factors. But how are we to under-
stand the notion of genetic determination? Historically,
there have been two dominant proposals: a ‘causal account’
on which traits are genetically determined if caused (in the
appropriate way) by genetic factors [25,26], and a ‘represen-
tational account’ on which traits are genetically determined
if represented in (or encoded by) the genes [22,27]. Neither
strategy has met with much success.
The principal problem with the causal approach is that
no one has been able to explain what the appropriate
causal relation between genes and innate traits is
supposed to be. The obvious candidate is that innate traits
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must be caused entirely by genetic factors. This is, for
example, a view that the ethologist Konrad Lorenz
sometimes appeared to endorse [25]. But the folly of this
proposal has long been recognized, as complex biological
traits are not caused by genes alone but depend on
interactions between genetic and non-genetic factors [28].
This is simply a variant of the Interactionist Thesis
mentioned earlier. Moreover, other attempts to character-
ize genetic determination in terms of genetic causation
have been similarly unsuccessful [29,30].
Nor have attempts to provide a representational
account of genetic determination proven any easier. The
least contentious, although still far from straightforward,
sense in which genes represent anything, is the familiar
thesis that DNA contains a ‘coded representation’ of
proteins [31]. Yet even if such claims are relatively
unproblematic, what is required is not merely an account
of how genes code for proteins, but an account on which
genes can represent complex phenotypic traits, such as
cognitive structures. As developmental systems theorists
are fond of pointing out, however, no such notion of
representation appears to exist [12]. Suppose, for example,
one adopts an account of representation on which a gene
(or suite of genes) represents a phenotypic trait if and only
if the trait causally covaries with it. This is, in effect, an
application of the standard mathematical notion of
information. But this proposal is unsatisfactory because
it seems overwhelmingly likely that all traits causally
covary with both genetic and environmental factors, in
which case all traits will be represented in both the
environment and the genome [30]. So the question is: What
alternative notion of representation (information or cod-
ing) would capture an appropriate notion of genetic
representation? At present, no satisfactory proposal exists
(but see [32] for a useful discussion of recent efforts and
[33] for a recent informational approach to innateness that
aims to avoid the sort of problem discussed here).
Innateness as developmental invariance
Problems with the notion of genetic determination have
led some theorists to explore alternative ways in which the
conceptual resources of biology might be brought to bear on
understanding innateness. Among the most common of
these are so-called ‘invariance accounts’ (for further
proposals see Box 1). Such proposals differ in detail, but
they all share the idea that innate traits are developmen-
tally invariant with respect to some appropriate range of
environments. The philosopher of biology Elliott Sober
provides a representative formulation when he suggests
that ‘a phenotypic trait is innate for a given genotype if and
only if that phenotype will emerge in all of a range of
developmental environments’, roughly, the normal
environments for organisms with that genotype [34].
The invariance account possesses several notable
virtues. For example, it captures the commonly held
view that innate traits are developmentally stable. More-
over, in conjunction with widely held assumptions about
intra-species genotypic similarity, it explains why innate
traits are often universal in the sense of being possessed by
all (normally functioning) members of the species. Still,
the account is not without its problems. In particular, it
appears to have the highly implausible consequence that
traits can be both learned and innate – a result that is
strongly at variance with the notion of innateness as used
by cognitive scientists. The problem arises in the case of
traits that are highly invariant, although only because the
environmental conditions required to learn them are
ubiquitous. So, for instance, it is plausible to maintain
that pretty much every human acquires the belief that
Box 1. Other biologically inspired accounts of innateness
The main text omits several biological accounts of innateness that
have been suggested in recent years. In what follows I briefly
consider two such proposals: the view of innateness as canalization
and the view that innateness can be characterized in terms of the
notion of heritability from quantative genetics.
Innateness as canalization
On this view, a trait of an organism (with a given genotype G) is innate
to the extent that it is ‘canalized’ in organisms with G; and the trait is
canalized to the extent that its development is insensitive to the range
of environmental conditions under which it emerges [39,40]. So, for
example, my possession of legs is (highly) innate on this view
because, for organisms with the same genotype as me, the
development of legs is highly insensitive to variation in environ-
mental conditions.
The canalization account is a close relative of the invariance
approach and, as such, inherits the virtues of that approach.
Moreover, by requiring that the development of innate traits is
insensitive to environmental variation – as opposed to merely
invariant across environments – it appears to avoid the objection that
I leveled against the invariance account (but see [41], for a discussion
of this claim). Even so, the canalization account has been criticized on
several grounds. One common concern is that it threatens to trivialize
debate over innateness [24]. In brief, the worry is that assessments of
canalization depend on what sorts of environmental variability one
takes to be relevant to the process at hand; and this, in turn, appears
to depend on the explanatory interests of those who use the concept
of canalization in the first place. The concern is thus that disputes
over innateness end up merely reflecting differences of explanatory
emphasis.
Innateness as high heritability
On this view, a trait is innate if and only if it is highly heritable –
roughly speaking, variation within the population with respect to this
trait is disproportionately due to genetic differences as opposed to
environmental ones.
On the face of it, this account is an attractive one because it both
preserves the intuition that innate traits are in some way determined
by the genes and accords well with the tendency of cognitive
scientists to invoke heritability studies – especially on twins – in
support of innateness hypotheses [6]. Yet while high heritability
might be evidence of innateness, I deny that it defines what
innateness is. Perhaps the most obvious problem is that high
heritability is not necessary for innateness [42]. This is clearest in the
case of traits – such as opposable thumbs in humans – that are near
fixation and so possessed by all ‘normal’ members of a population.
As standardly defined, heritability is the proportion of overall
phenotypic variation that is due to genetic variation (i.e. Vg/Vp). So,
where there is no phenotypic variation (as with opposable thumbs)
the denominator Vp is zero and the heritability of the trait is not even
defined. The obvious response is to enlarge our population to include
organisms that do not possess the trait. But this can lead to some
highly implausible consequences. Suppose, for example, that
humans only lack opposable thumbs when a drug taken by the
mother during pregnancy disrupts fetal development [40]. In such
cases, phenotypic variation is due to environmental differences.
Hence, the trait will have a low heritability and not be innate (see [40]
for further discussion of the problems).
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water is wet under normal environmental conditions and,
moreover, that we learn it. But if this is so, then the belief
that water is wet can be both learned and innate on the
invariance account: a conclusion that might suffice to show
that the account is untenable [35].
Innateness and cognitive science
If the above arguments are to be believed, then the
prospects of providing an account of innateness in terms of
genetic determination are unpromising, and the invar-
iance alternative yields consequences that are at odds with
how the notion of innateness functions in cognitive science.
This clearly does not exhaust the full range of ways in
which biological concepts might be invoked to characterize
innateness (see Box 1 for further examples). But the track
record to date is rather bleak, and this might suggest the
need to look elsewhere for an account of innateness. In the
remainder of this article, I consider the possibility that
the notion of innateness used by cognitive scientists
should be understood (at least partially) in terms of
concepts that derive from psychology or even from
cognitive science itself.
Innateness as not learned
This suggestion is hardly a novel one. Indeed, among the
most common characterizations of innate traits is that
they are the ones that are not learned. This view has some
notable strengths, such as explaining why learned traits
are not innate and why learnability arguments – argu-
ments purporting to show that a given trait cannot be
learned – support innateness hypotheses. But there are
also some obvious worries with this formulation. A first
and, I think, relatively minor one is that it yields
counterintuitive results when applied to non-psychological
traits. A patch of sunburn, for example, is not learned and
yet it is surely not innate either. But even if we restrict our
attention to those traits that concern us most – namely
cognitive traits – the account will only be of use if some
appropriate notion of learning can be identified, and this is
not a straightforward task because the term ‘learning’
turns out to be almost as slippery as ‘innateness’ [35].
Innateness as psychological primitiveness
A more recent but closely related suggestion is that innate
cognitive structures are ‘psychologically primitive’ in
(roughly) the sense that they are not acquired by
cognitive/psychological processes [24,35]. To put the
proposal in a slightly different way: although innate
cognitive structures are acquired in the minimal sense,
it is not at the cognitive/psychological level(s) of expla-
nation – but some lower (biological) level – that an
account of how they are acquired is to be found. In short,
innate cognitive structures are the ones whose acquisition
psychology cannot explain.
One central reason for developing this psychological
primitiveness account of innateness is to handle the sorts
of difficulties that plague other accounts (see [35] for
detailed discussion). But another reason is that it might
help to explain the peculiar significance of innateness
hypotheses to cognitive science. As mentioned earlier,
many areas of biology have dispensed with the notion of
innateness altogether – in large measure because it no
longer plays any useful theoretical role [14]. Why then
should it continue to have a foothold in the cognitive
sciences? One possibility is that this is an unfortunate
oversight that should be remedied immediately [12]. But if
the present proposal is correct, then the notion of
innateness in fact functions to frame two issues of genuine
importance to psychology and cognitive science. First, it
delimits the scope of psychological explanation: once we
know that a given structure is innate, we also know that
our scientific psychology should not – indeed cannot – be
expected to explain how it was acquired and that we must
instead look to biology or some other science for an
explanation. Second, discovering which structures are
innate also furnishes us with the resources – the ‘building
blocks’ – from which to construct developmental psycho-
logical theories. Such theories must, on pain of regress,
presuppose the existence of structures whose acquisition is
not explained by psychology. So, if we know that a
given structure is innate, then it can be invoked by
psychological theories to explain the development of
other psychological traits.
In its present form, however, the psychological primi-
tiveness account still will not do. One problem too complex
to consider here is that the account presupposes some
appropriate distinction between psychological/cognitive
levels of explanation and other levels of scientific
explanation; and although it is widely assumed in
cognitive science that some such distinction exists, it is
far from straightforward how best to draw it. A second
problem that I will discuss briefly is that, in its present
form, the proposal over-generalizes by incorrectly char-
acterizing some cognitive structures as innate even though
no one would count them as such. This problem is clearest
in the case of psychological effects that result when
environmental insults produce brain lesions. In such
cases, cognitive scientists are not at all inclined to view
the outcomes as innately specified even though the
explanation is likely to be a neurobiological rather than
a psychological one.
How might this over-generalization problem be
addressed? One plausible response is to add an extra
clause to the account, such as the following ‘normalcy
condition’: A cognitive structure is innate for a given
organism only if they would acquire it in the normal course
of events. No doubt, there is much that could be done to
clarify what counts as ‘a normal course of events’ [15,36],
and perhaps this might be done by invoking the notions of
developmental invariance or canalization discussed ear-
lier in the article. For present purposes, however, I leave
such matters of detail to one side and focus instead on two
more general points. First, adding a normalcy condition
seems like the right kind of strategy for addressing the
over-generalization problem. This is because the cases
that seem to pose a problem for the primitiveness view
(e.g. psychological effects resulting from environmentally
produced brain lesions) are clear instances of abnormal
development.
Second, although it would be desirable to provide a more
precise account of normalcy, I suggest that the task is no
more pressing in the present context than it is in most
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other areas of science. My reason for saying this is that all
sciences – with the possible exception of physics –
typically assume some largely unarticulated set of normal
conditions in formulating their laws and generalizations.
In the jargon of philosophy, they are ceteris paribus
generalizations that apply only when all else is equal
[37,38]. Much the same is likely to be true of innateness
hypotheses in developmental psychology and other areas
of cognitive science. In effect, they are generalizations
that, like virtually all other scientific generalizations,
tacitly assume some set of background normal conditions.
On this view, notions of normalcy are no more important to
understanding innateness hypotheses in cognitive science
than they are to understanding hypotheses in geology,
economics or, for that matter, aerodynamics.
Conclusion
In this article I reviewed some of the more prominent
accounts of innateness and sketched their various
strengths and weaknesses (see also Box 2 for other
questions relating to theories of innateness). It was argued
that proposals drawing on either the commonsense
connotations of ‘innate’ or the conceptual resources of
biology are unlikely to prove satisfactory, and that this
might indicate that the notion of innateness used by
cognitive scientists is not simply borrowed from elsewhere
but internal to cognitive science itself. Finally, a specific
account of innateness was outlined – the psychological
primitiveness account – that takes this suggestion
seriously. Although I do not expect the reader to be
convinced by the above brief comments, I do hope to
stimulate a more systematic debate about innateness; one
that does not simply reiterate firmly entrenched opinions
on the matter, but critically assesses the role and
significance that the notion of innateness does and should
have for cognitive science.
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Two pills, two paths: a tale of gender bias by M. Potts
Joseph Banks: Pacific pictures by P. Fara
and coming soon
Mr Blandowski misses out: discovery and loss of fish species in 19th century Australia by P. Humphries
The traffic and display of body parts in the early 19th century by S. Alberti and S. Chaplin
Exhibiting monstrosity: Chang and Eng, the ’original’ Siamese twins by S. Mitchell
The ancient mariner and the transit of Venus at Hudson Bay by R. Griffin-Short
‘I got rhythm’: Gershwin and birth control in the 1930s by P. Viterbo
The market for Julia Pastrana by J. Browne and S. Messenger
Race mixing and science in the United States by P. Farber
Continental drift under the Third Reich by E. Buffetaut
The first president of the Royal Society by P. Fara
and much, much more . . .
Locate Endeavour in the BioMedNet Reviews collection (http://reviews.bmn.com)
or on ScienceDirect (http://www.sciencedirect.com)
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